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ABSTRACT 
The changes addressed to a retail market, due to the liberalization of electricity market, may 
have an impact on the effectiveness of energy efficiency policies, which in most cases are 
calibrated to act on consumers. In many countries, the liberalization process is still going on 
and in those in which it was completed, due to the limited number of years that have passed, 
available data is not sufficient to understand how energy efficiency policies perform under a 
liberalized market.  
This thesis tries to give an answer to this question through a rational analysis of the possible 
benefits and problems that might occur. Before, a description of the most important energy 
efficiency policies currently active in the European landscape is provided together with an 
illustration of more obvious critical issues. After, attention is instead paid to issues relating to 
energy efficiency that may arise from the liberalization of the electricity market. Finally, the 
part most significant in application terms is treated, namely how the common policy 
instruments for energy efficiency could perform in a liberalized market. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Energy efficiency is on the focus of national energy policies in many countries thanks to the 
potential benefits that its improvement can offer. Its supporters commonly cite benefits such 
as energy saving (reduction in energy consumption), environmental improvement (reduction 
in greenhouse gases and other pollutants), increased energy security, improved consumer 
welfare, increased economic competitiveness, and job creation (Schnapp, 2012). Because 
these benefits are widely shared, great efforts have been carried out during the last four 
decades to understand the potential of energy efficiency, its effects, and its weaknesses in 
order to develop more effective energy efficiency policies. Parallel to this, always in the 
energy sector, there has been another important change that has required a long gestation 
period and very high attention: the liberalization of the electricity market. This began more 
than 20 years ago in Great Britain and later many other nations have followed the Great 
Britain’s lead and introduced comprehensive electricity sector reform programs. The scheme 
commonly adopted was to introduce competitive wholesale markets in the generation sector, 
to create legal monopolies with the presence of basic performance in the transmission-
distribution sectors, and to introduce competition between suppliers in the retail supply sector. 
Precisely the changes addressed to a retail market, which by its nature is in close contact with 
end users, may have an impact on the effectiveness of energy efficiency policies, which in 
most cases are calibrated to act on consumers. 
At this point a question begins to arise: how will energy efficiency policies perform in 
liberalized markets? In many countries, the liberalization process is still going on and in those 
in which it was completed, due to the limited number of years that have passed, available data 
is not sufficient to provide an answer.  
The objective of this thesis therefore is to try to give an answer to this question through a 
rational analysis of the possible benefits and problems that might occur. Before, to 
contextualize the discourse, a description of the most important energy efficiency policies 
currently active in the European landscape will be provided together with an illustration of 
more obvious critical issues. After, attention will instead be paid to issues relating to energy 
efficiency that may arise from the liberalization of the electricity market. Finally, the part 
most significant in application terms will be treated, namely how the common policy 
instruments for energy efficiency could perform in a liberalized market. 
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To better understand the structure of this thesis, a scheme is provided in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1 - Structure of thesis 
Source: Own elaboration 
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2  ENERGY EFFICIENCY – Introduction 
Energy efficiency is considered one of the most important points in the energy strategy of 
many countries. This is because it is considered a valuable means to address challenges like 
dependence on energy imports, scarce energy resources, and the need to limit climate change.  
This work, anyway, is not focused on the potential or less of energy efficiency, but on how 
energy efficiency policies are performing now and how they will perform under a liberalized 
electricity market. Before beginning to treat this argument a general introduction is given on 
basic concepts of energy efficiency policy. This is necessary because in this way the 
understanding of treated topics will be more immediate.  
The upcoming part is an explanation about the difference between energy efficiency and 
energy savings, followed by a description of the energy efficiency paradox. Finally, the 
chapter closes with an illustration of the typical instruments for promoting energy efficiency.  
2.1 Energy efficiency vs. Energy savings 
To understand the difference that distinguishes these two terms, it is necessary to begin with 
their definition. “Energy efficiency means that we use less energy inputs while maintaining an 
equivalent level of economic activity or service. Energy savings is an absolute decrease of 
energy consumption and can be done through increased energy efficiency, behavior changes 
or even decreased economic activities” (EC, 2011). The terms ‘energy efficiency’ and ‘energy 
savings’ are often seen as interchangeable, but there is a significant difference between the 
two. An increase in energy saving always leads to a reduction in energy consumption, 
whereas an increase in energy efficiency does not always turn into a reduction in energy 
consumption. The latter statement can be explained considering the situation in which the 
rebound effect (it will be widely explain in section 2.2.2) is very significant, precisely in this 
case, indeed, there is an increase of energy demand despite an increment of energy efficiency. 
Therefore, sometimes even if products and processes are becoming more efficient, the energy 
consumption keeps increasing. 
2.2 The Energy Efficiency Paradox 
Now that the difference between Energy efficiency and Energy saving has been explained, it 
is appropriate to add that energy efficiency is interested in two paradoxes. The first paradox 
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(known as the energy efficiency gap) relates to the fact that energy efficiency and 
conservation measures have not been widely implemented despite their apparently large 
socio-economic benefits and the second (known as the Rebound Effect)  is linked to the 
growth of total energy consumption despite the large improvements in energy efficiency 
(Linares and Labandeira, 2010). To better understand these two paradoxes it is necessary to 
explore them more deeply in the sections below.  
2.2.1 The Energy Efficiency Gap 
Linares and Labandeira (2010) explain the energy efficiency gap by claiming that although 
energy efficiency and conservation seem to present clear economic and environmental 
advantages, the level of investment in them does not reach the levels which would correspond 
to such benefits. This can be seen as a reflection of the presence of barriers. These Barriers 
exist due to market failures, behavioral problems of customers and regulatory failures. The 
Impact Assessment (EC, 2011), part of the European Energy Efficiency Plan 2011, can help 
to illustrate which barriers generally hinder investments in energy efficiency.  
The following lines provide an overview on these barriers: 
Energy market prices 
Energy market prices do not reflect all costs to society and this leads to not having an optimal 
level of investment in energy efficiency. The costs that are not taken into account are related 
with environmental externalities such as pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, depletion of 
resources, and geopolitical dependency.  
Harmful subsidies, regulated prices and negative incentives 
Harmful subsidies are all those subsidies present to support primary energy sources. These 
had a value of US$ 557 billion in 2008 (IEA et al., 2010) and they can lead to distorted price 
signals. Regulated prices, notably for gas and electricity, that are still present in some 
countries can also distort price signals. Finally, negative incentives are another problem, for 
example: higher taxes have to be paid on a building because its price is increased due to the 
implementation of energy efficiency measures. 
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Imperfect and Asymmetric information 
Consumers often have a limited knowledge and little information about benefits and possible 
energy efficiency solutions available on the market or the ways in which they can be carried 
out or supplied. 
Asymmetric information is a special form of imperfect information. Different subjects present 
in the market have a different level of knowledge, for example, providers of energy efficiency 
solutions are more informed about energy efficiency technology than consumers, who 
sometimes do not realize the potential of reducing their energy bills or who do not know their 
energy consumption. 
Sometimes consumers have all the information, but due to bounded rationality there is not a 
perfect decision making process. For example, investment decisions for energy efficiency 
equipment have to be discounted over a long-term period; even though this calculation 
process comes to the right result, consumers prefer to decide on traditional or non-logical 
rules. 
Split incentives or principal-agent problem  
In the energy efficiency field there are often two types of split incentives. The first is related 
to the fact that, those who benefit from these advantages are not those who have paid for the 
energy efficiency improvements. For example, in the case of a landlord-tenant, where the 
landlord should invest in building renovation works, but the tenant normally pays the energy 
bill and benefits from its reduction. Due to this, the landlord will not be interested in investing 
in high efficiency equipment because he will try to minimize his investment, given that the 
reduction of his tenant’s energy bills it is not one of his priorities. The second can be found in 
liberalized electricity markets. Here, electricity retail companies are the perfect choice to 
deliver energy efficiency measures to consumers, but this is in contrast with the business 
model of these companies because an increase of energy efficiency corresponds to a reduction 
in the need of energy and therefore a reduction of sales.   
Missing or incomplete markets 
Missing or incomplete markets generate a problem related to the low number of trained 
professional (such as architects, energy auditors, builders, installers, sales assistants) and the 
lack of infrastructure. All of this may start a vicious circle because the lack of a credible and 
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mature offering market prevents the emergence of a dynamic demand market which in turn is 
a barrier to the uptake of the offering market. 
Financial barriers 
The funding of energy efficiency measures can become a barrier for their diffusion. 
Sometimes the cost of interventions can be too high, therefore bringing the potential 
interested subject to turn to the credit market. However, it is not always said that the latter 
accepts the request. Indeed, so-called credit-worthiness is often insufficient to borrow money, 
even if it is a beneficial investment. 
In many cases energy efficiency interventions are small scale and decentralized. This leads to 
an increase in transaction costs and further slows the uptake of financial products (EC, 2011). 
Regulatory failures 
The problem of investment in energy efficiency is, in some countries, due to the lack of a 
comprehensive policy framework including regulatory and support instruments, and poor 
enforcement. Moreover, frequent changes in the legal framework introduce a climate of risk 
which can discourage investors. Finally, energy efficiency and savings are often considered 
too technical and for this reason their political visibility is not high enough, therefore reducing 
the interest of politicians. 
2.2.2 The Rebound Effect 
The Rebound Effect can be explained as the phenomenon whereby, in spite of certain 
improvements in the energy efficiency of individual products (e.g. appliances, cars and 
buildings), overall energy consumption, linked to their use, doesn't decrease in a proportional 
way, rather in some cases consumption can be equal or greater. To better understand this 
phenomenon it is interesting to take into account the following example: “even if cars 
produced today are more efficient, the overall energy consumption of the car fleet grows 
because we use them more regularly and buy bigger ones” (EC, 2011). 
The Rebound Effect can be also considered a way for measuring to some extent the difference 
between energy efficiency and energy conservation: the latter is an absolute reduction in 
energy demand, whereas the former is a relative measure. (Linares and Labandeira, 2010).  
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2.3 Typical Energy Efficiency Policy Instruments 
Before beginning with an explanation of all policy instruments it is important to introduce a 
phenomenon known as Free-Riding Behavior, which occurs when agents receive incentives to 
realize energy efficiency measures that would be implemented also in the absence of 
incentives. For example: a consumer uses incentives for the replacement of his boiler, but not 
because he wants to buy a more efficient one, but because it is broken (therefore he would 
buy a new one anyway). This can be considered as a waste of resources because incentives 
help the realization of energy efficiency interventions, which would have been executed 
anyway. 
After this small parenthesis on this phenomenon harmful to the economic efficiency of energy 
efficiency policies, the discussion can return to concentrate on policy instruments.  
Technological Standards 
Technological Standards can be defined as minimum energy efficiency requirements for 
energy equipment (Linares and Labandeira, 2010). These instruments can be considered 
interesting for politicians because they are easily implementable, customers very often do not 
have a way to know the costs, and they permit the possibility of good results in terms of 
efficiency on products on which they are applied. Moreover, they can help to overcome some 
barriers. Given that Standards are applied on all products within a product category, they can 
address the problem of false decisions making linked to bounded rationality. Or given that 
only the producers are interested in the implementation of standards on their products, 
Imperfect and Asymmetric information is partially solved. Not completely because, for 
example, consumers do not know how much they will save, or  if energy prices will increase 
or decrease in the future (thus making the use of the appliance less interesting). 
Taxes 
The act of taxes on the price signal is considered by many economists to be the most powerful 
instrument for promoting energy conservation and efficiency (Linares and Labandeira, 2010). 
However, recent research (Jossoe and Rapson, 2013) has demonstrated that the combination 
of taxes and information policies has provided greater benefits than the use of only taxes and 
also it is possible to deduce that information policies can be considered an instrument more 
powerful than taxes for the promotion of energy efficiency. 
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Taxes can adjust the prices for energy to reflect the environmental externalities. For example, 
a tax set on fossil fuels, affects the costs of production and the selling prices. 
Subsidies 
Subsidies provide direct financial incentives for investments in energy efficiency. They have 
the form of direct payments to tax credits, they are highly popular socially and politically, and 
often they are used for promoting the sale of efficient appliances. Experts (e.g. Jaffe and 
Stavins 1995, Hasset and  Metcalf 1995) found that subsidies were more effective than an 
equivalent price increase. However, they also have a negative aspect, in fact they allow (and 
certainly favour) the rebound effect by reducing the effective price of energy, and promote 
free-riding (Linares and Labandeira, 2010). 
Information Policies 
Information Policies can be defined as instruments with the purpose of reducing information 
deficits in order to foster investments in energy efficiency. The two principal ways to provide 
information are energy audits and labeling. The first is often used by utilities to inform 
consumers about their consumption behavior in order to invite them to consume energy in 
periods of lower demand, thus contributing to the reduction of demand peak. The second is 
known to consumers as Energy Star or energy consumption labels. These labels have the 
purpose to inform consumers about the energy consumption of appliances and about their 
level of efficiency, thus promoting the transparency of the market and competition between 
producers to produce more efficient appliances.   
Energy Efficiency Obligations 
Energy Efficiency Obligations change based on how they are practiced, the interest of energy 
sectors, the methods of financing, and the complexity country by country, but the basic idea is 
always the same, namely to impose on retail companies to achieve a predetermined value of 
energy savings. One of the most important differences is the presence or not of white 
certificates. These represent a certain amount of energy saved that can be exchanged between 
the different subjects present in the market, such as: Obligated parties, Non-Obligated parties 
and ESCO (Energy Service Companies). 
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Energy Efficiency Obligations are used frequently in European countries and they are one of 
the most important instruments indicated in the DIRECTIVE 2012/27/EU for achieving the 
2020 European objectives.  
More details about these instruments are provided in chapter 3. 
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3 ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES IN EUROPE – An Overview 
After the motivations that have led to develop this thesis and after a wide introduction on 
energy efficiency in general, Energy Efficiency Paradoxes and instruments for its promotion, 
it is time to begin focusing on the European policies framework associated with the spread of 
energy efficiency measures. 
The last chapter also describes the instruments for energy efficiency promotion but  in totally 
generic way, instead in the following the real situation of the European framework is 
presented, through an introduction of the main energy efficiency policies in Europe.  
Its primary purpose is to provide a detailed description of the schemes that characterized the 
policies in states like: Denmark, Belgium (Flanders), Italy, France and Great Britain, in such a 
way to understand how they work, their results, energy sectors interested, methods of 
financing and complexity. However before starting with this description, it is necessary to 
introduce, given its importance, the European Directive 2012/27 whose purpose is to lead all 
Member States to achieve the goals set for 2020, in order to improve the Union's security of 
supply, reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a cost effective way and create high quality jobs 
in several sectors related to energy efficiency. 
Therefore the chapter is structured in this way. The first section presents an overview on the 
Directive 2012/27/EU, while the subsequent sections describe the energy efficiency policies 
of Denmark, Flanders, Italy, France and Great Britain. 
3.1  Directive 2012/27/EU 
The purpose of this Directive is to create a common framework in Europe for the promotion 
of energy efficiency measures and for defining rules necessary to remove the barriers in the 
energy market and to overcome market failures. Moreover, it lays down that each Member 
State shall set an indicative national energy efficiency target, based on either primary or final 
energy consumption, primary or final energy savings, or energy intensity. In phase of 
definition of targets each Member State has to remember that the Union's 2020 energy 
consumption has to be no more than 1474 Mtoe of primary energy or no more than 1078 
Mtoe of final energy (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2012 ). 
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Returning to the purpose the common framework is created through guidelines which have 
the goal to uniform as much as possible the actions undertaken in each Member State to 
achieve the national targets. In the lines below are summarized the most important parts of 
guidelines related with end-use energy sector. 
Article 4 Member States shall establish a long term strategy for mobilizing investment in the 
renovation of the national stock of residential and commercial buildings, both public and 
private. A first version of the strategy shall be published by 30 April 2014 and update every 
three years thereafter and submitted to the Commission as part of the National Efficiency 
Action Plans. 
Article 5 Each member State shall ensure that, as from 1 January 2014, 3% of the total floor 
area heated and/or cooled buildings owned and occupied by its central government is 
renovated each year to meet at least the minimum energy performance. Moreover, they shall 
encourage public bodies at regional and local level, and social housing bodies governed by 
public law to adopt an energy efficiency plan, put in place an energy management system and 
use, where appropriate, energy service companies, and energy performance contracting to 
finance renovations and implement plans to maintain or improve energy efficiency in long 
term. 
Article 6 Member States shall ensure that central governments purchase only products, 
services and buildings with high energy-efficiency performance, insofar as that is consistent 
with cost-effectiveness, economical feasibility, wider sustainability, technical suitability, as 
well as sufficient competition.   
Article 7 Each Member State shall set up an energy efficiency obligation scheme. That 
scheme shall ensure that energy distributors and/or retail energy sales companies achieve a 
cumulative end-use energy savings target by 31 December 2020. As an alternative to setting 
up an energy efficiency obligation scheme, Member States may opt to take other policy 
measures to achieve energy savings among final customers.  These may include the following 
policies or combinations thereof: 
 energy or CO2 taxes that have the effect of reducing end-use energy consumption; 
 financing schemes and instruments or fiscal incentives that lead to the application of 
energy-efficient technology or techniques and have the effect of reducing end-use 
energy consumption; 
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 regulations or voluntary agreements that lead to the application of energy-efficiency or 
techniques and have the effect of reducing end-use energy consumption; 
 standards and norms that aim at improving the energy efficiency of products and 
services, including buildings and vehicles; 
 energy labeling schemes; 
 training and education, including energy advisory programs; 
Article 8 Member States shall promote the availability to all final customers of high quality 
energy audits which are cost-effective and carried out in an independent manner by qualified 
and/or accredited experts according to qualification criteria, or implemented and supervised 
by independent authorities under national legislation.  
Article 9 Member State shall ensure that, in so far as it is technically possible, financially 
reasonable and proportionate in relation to the potential energy savings, final customers for 
electricity, natural gas, district heating system, district cooling and domestic hot water are 
provided with competitively priced individual meters that accurately reflect the final 
customer’s actual energy consumption and that provide information on actual time of use. 
Article 10 – 11 Where final customers do not have smart meters, Member States shall ensure 
that billing information is accurate and based on actual consumption, for all the sectors 
covered the Directive, including energy distributors, distribution system operators and retail 
energy sales companies, where this is technically possible and economically justified. 
Moreover, customers must receive all their bills and billing information for energy 
consumption free of charge and they have access to their consumption data in an appropriate 
way and free of charge. 
Article 13 Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable in case of non-
compliance with the national provisions adopted and shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure that they are implemented. 
Not only the end-use of energy is taken in consideration by the Directive, also for the energy 
supply sector are present some guidelines. These affecting, for instance, the promotion of the 
efficiency in heating and cooling (in particular high-efficiency cogeneration) or energy 
transformation, transmission and distribution sectors. In the latter, Member States besides 
ensure the implementation of energy efficiency measures in the network infrastructure, shall 
ensure that national energy regulatory authorities, through the development of network tariffs 
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and regulations, provide incentives for grid operators to make available system services to 
network users permitting them to implement energy efficiency improvement measures in the 
context of the continuing deployment of smart grids. 
Moreover, each Member State shall ensure that information on available energy efficiency 
mechanisms and financial and legal frameworks is transparent and where the level of 
technical competence, objectivity and reliability is insufficient, initiate training programs for 
providers of energy efficiency services, energy audits, energy managers and installers. 
By 30 April 2014 and every three years thereafter, Member States shall submit National 
Energy Efficiency Action Plans. The National Energy Efficiency Action Plans shall cover 
significant energy efficiency improvement measures and expected and/or achieved energy 
savings, including those in the supply, transmission and distribution of energy as well as 
energy end-use. Moreover, every year, Member States shall report on the progress achieved 
towards their targets. These annual reports and the National Energy Efficiency Action Plans 
are evaluated by Commission and assessed the extent to which Member States have made 
progress towards the achievement of the national energy efficiency targets. 
Finally, in the last part of the Directive, between the annexes, are illustrated the common 
methods and principles for calculating the impact of energy efficiency policies indicated in 
the article 7. Obligated, participating or entrusted parties, or implementing public authorities 
may use one or more of the following methods: 
 deemed savings, by reference to the results of previous independently monitored 
energy improvements in similar installations. The generic approach is termed ‘ex-
ante’; 
 metered savings, whereby the savings from the installation of a measure, or package 
of measures, is determined by recording the actual reduction in energy use, taking due 
account of factors such as additionality, occupancy, production levels and the weather 
which may affect consumption. The generic approach is termed ‘ex-post’; 
 scaled savings, whereby engineering estimates of savings are used. This approach may 
only be used where establishing robust measured data for a specific installation is 
difficult or disproportionately expensive; 
 surveyed savings, where consumers’ response to advice, information campaigns, 
labeling or certification schemes, or smart metering is determined. This approach may 
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only be used for savings resulting from changes in consumer behavior. It may not be 
used for savings resulting from the installation of physical measures. 
 
3.2  Denmark 
Since 1970, energy efficiency has been one of the top priorities of the Danish political 
agenda. The regulation framework has been changed and updated many times during the past 
years with the introduction of energy tax on households (1977) and CO2 tax on all sectors 
(1996) (Togeby et al. 2009).  
In 1996, the ability to define agreements between the energy intensive firms and Danish 
Energy Agency was implemented (Energi Styrelsen, ES). In these agreements, which were 
linked with the green tax system, both parties established the amount of energy savings after 
an analysis of the potential savings.  The achievement of the predefined targets permitted the 
firms to obtain a reduction of the amount of taxes payable. This scheme in 2010 was limited 
to the electricity used in heavy industry processes and to heating the industrial spaces, making 
it thereby accessible only for the largest electricity consumers (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). 
In conjunction with the actions implemented in 1996, in the following year the Electricity 
Savings Trust (EST) was created with the aim to promote cost-effective electricity savings in 
households and public institutions. The activities are primarily information activities, 
voluntary agreements and technology procurement.  
Subsequently, in 2006 an energy efficiency obligations system was imposed on all the 
electricity, natural gas, and district heating grid companies. Initially, the obligations were 
intended only for the sectors listed above, thus excluding the commercial oil companies. 
However, the latter have chosen voluntarily to join, widening the system to all energy 
providers. The strong points of this system are the simplicity of its regulatory framework 
(there is only one regulator, the Danish Agency of Energy) and the wide freedom that the 
energy providers have to choose the energy efficiency measures to implement. In fact, they 
can choose to develop them in any energy sector (except transport) and everywhere in the 
country (not only in the areas which them compete). Moreover, the electricity providers can 
achieve the targets through their commercial branch (the most frequent choice). Energy 
savings can be calculated as a specific calculation, or they can be based on standard values. 
The first is an engineering calculation based on individual factors about the project, while the 
second is a catalogue of standard values for approximately 200 savings project (new window, 
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isolation, new appliances, new boiler, etc) (Togeby et al. 2009). The system does not provide 
public subsidies, whereby the providers can recover their investments through the increase of 
customer tariffs. Sanctions are not provided and the cost of this scheme in 2011 was about 5,6 
cent.€/kWh, including administrative and implementation costs. In the first years of 
introduction, the results of the obligations scheme were above the target. Indeed, the first 
objective set was a saving of 7,5PJ in the period 2006-2013, which thanks to the success of 
the obligations system, was increased to 10,3PJ for 2010. This change has led to estimated 
savings of 1,5% of the consumption of 2006 in the period 2010-2020 (Sàenz de Miera et al., 
2013).  
The obligations system is a part of wider action plan in which are adopted other different 
energy efficiency measures such as: building codes, labeling of appliances, and directives on 
public sector savings. 
Also, in 2006 the system of buildings labeling introduced in 1979 was modified. The updated 
version of the energy labeling scheme for buildings requires that all buildings are labeled 
before they are sold. The labeling report consists of a label (A to G) with individual 
recommendation on how to reduce the energy consumption. The energy label is calculated 
based on information about building physics and its cost is borne by the owner (650€ per 
label in 2009). Also new buildings must be labeled before they are taken into use. This can 
act as a control of the building code. Labeling is obligatory but without specification of 
possible sanctions. The impact of the labeling on total saving was defined close to zero. For 
instance, after a study on gas natural consumption on 4000 small buildings with and without 
an energy label, Kjærbye (cited by Togeby et al., 2009) did not find significant difference 
between the two cases. 
Finally, in 2008 the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) was 
added, which applies to most installations with a capacity above 20MW. These include the 
energy sector (electricity generation and district heating) as well as industrial installations 
(Togeby et al., 2009).  
 
3.3 Flanders (Belgium) 
In the period of 2003-2012, energy efficiency obligations on electricity distribution operators 
were introduced. For achieving the targets, the Flemish system permitted the implementation 
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of saving measures in other energy fields beyond electricity, providing a high amount of 
flexibility. Moreover, a banking technique was permitted, which is the possibility to use the 
saving surplus produced in a given year in the following years. 
The majority of the measures that were implemented were linked to the interventions on 
customer’s buildings like: isolation, solar thermal panels, double glazing (in residential or 
non-residential buildings). Afterwards, for recovering the costs, electricity providers had the 
option to gain access to regional subsidies and to increase their electricity tariffs. The last 
option was linked to the approval of the government's budget allocated to energy efficiency 
measures. Every year, each electricity provider must provide the action plan to the Flemish 
Energy Agency (VEA) with a detailed explanation about the measures that they would like to 
develop in the following year and with a calculation of the energy savings obtainable. Once 
received and evaluated, only the plans that obtained the approval from the institutions could 
be executed. In cases of failure to achieve the target defined, the provider had to pay a fine of 
0,10 €/KWh (for each KWh not achieved) to the Energy Fund (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). 
The goals of this system were very modest and, as it is possible observe in the graph below, 
they were overcome widely every year (except 2006).  
 
Figure 2 - Primary energy savings in Flemish system 
Source: VEA (Varese, 2013) 
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Before 2007, the targets were set on primary energy saving. Afterward, in the period 2007-
2008, a new target of 2% savings was set (annually target and respect the previous year) on 
consumption on low-voltage customers (<1000V) and 1% savings on high-voltage customers 
(>1000V). From 2008 to 2010 a target of 2% on consumption of residential customers and 
1,5% on non-residential customers was set. In the end, in the period 2010-2012, a target of 
savings of 2,5% was set on consumption of customers of small operations (less than 2500 
clients) and 3,5% on consumption of customers of operations with more than 2500 clients. 
The costs for the implementation of the measures (administrative costs are excluded) are 
summarized in the graph below and their increase is related to the increase of energy saved. 
 
Figure 3 - Costs for the implementation of the measures in Flemish system 
Source: VEA (Varese, 2013) 
 
Despite the good results in terms of energy saved, in 2012 the decision was made to change a 
part of the system. No longer were there energy saving targets, but instead obligatory actions 
for electricity distribution system operators, who must draw up an evaluation report every 
year before the 1st of May on the execution of the actions during the previous year. This 
change was justified by the difficulty to set a target that is both ambitious and realistic (too 
low: due to banking, risk of putting on hold new actions, too high: fines for distribution 
system operators), the absence of uniform actions in Flemish region (due to the freedom to 
chose the measures to implement), and the fairly high administrative burden of handing in and 
evaluating of action plans (Varese, 2013). 
An interesting aspect of the old and new system is the particular attention, from both public 
and private, to low income households through subsidies to purchase efficient appliances or 
for insulation of walls and roofs. 
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3.4 Italy 
In 2005, Italy introduced the system of white certificates (TEE: Titoli di Efficienza 
Energetica), which is characterized by a mechanism of obligations on electricity and natural 
gas distribution operators (interventions of saving on final costumers) and a mechanism of the 
market, through which agents may trade their certificates. 
The obligated parties fulfill their energy saving obligations through the cancellation of a 
number of TEEs corresponding predetermined objectives of saving. The TEEs (each one with 
a value of 1 TOE of primary energy and with a propriety of banking)  must be returned by 
obligated distributors to GSE by 31 May of the year following that of the obligation. The 
evaluation of the savings is made with three different methods: 
 Standard (based on technical data sheet deliberate AEEG): the savings are calculated 
in relation to the number of physical units of reference installed, for instance: number 
of fluorescent bulbs; 
 Analytical (based on technical data sheet deliberate AEEG): the savings are calculated 
according to an algorithm and the measure of few operating parameters of considered 
system; 
 Consumptive: the savings are calculated through a monitoring plan, which consider all 
the external factors that could condition the saving.  
The scheme is thought to have not only obligated parties active in the realization of energy 
saving interventions, but also other subjects. Indeed, in the system there are: obligated 
distributors (more than 50.000 clients), non-obligated distributors (less than 50.000 clients), 
ESCO (Energy Service Companies), parties who have actually appointed a person in charge 
of conservation and rational use of energy and finally companies operating in the industrial, 
residential, service, agricultural, transport and public service sectors, provided that they have 
appointed a person in charge of conservation and rational use of energy, or that they have put 
in place an energy management system certified under the ISO 50001 standard.  
The scheme establishes that, when the measures are implemented (in all the sectors indicated 
by the law), agents send a request of recognition to the manager of electric service (Gestore 
dei Servizi Elettrici, GSE). The request is verified by ENEA (National agency for new 
technology, energy, sustainable economic development) and, if the valuation is positive, the 
GME (Manager of Electric Market) will send corresponding white certificates. The procedure 
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is equal to all the subjects present in the system and it is the only way to obtain the TEEs 
directly from the GME. If the obligated parties do not want first person implementation of the 
measures on customers, they can purchase white certificates through bilateral contracts or in a 
market where they are sold by non-obligated subjects present in the system, or by obligated 
parties that have them in surplus. The cost supported by obligated distributors for fulfilling 
the obligations is recovered through a "unitary contribution on tariff", which is established 
annually and applied equally on all consumers.  
 
Figure 4 – Italian system of white certificates 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Until December 2007, the measures for achieving at least 50% of the target had to be 
implemented for  in the obligated subject activity area (electricity or natural gas sectors). 
After December 2007, this obligation was eliminated and now they have the option, as 
evidenced by the high number of TEE types (8 different types), to implement the energy 
efficiency measures in many different sectors besides electricity and natural gas. For instance: 
the transportation sector, emission reduction, technological innovations or primary energy.  
The annual objective for the following year for each obligated party is established considering 
the share of the national total distributed amount of electricity or gas in the year before (For 
example: the targets for the 2013 are decided in 2012 considering the energy provided in 
2011) and the method by which the sanctions are applied can be defined flexibly. Indeed, in 
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cases of failure to achieve the target of saving, a sanction is not always expected. If an 
obligated subject achieves at least the 60% of its target, he can compensate the missing part in 
the following year to avoid the sanction. However, if he does not achieve the 60%, he has to 
pay the sanctions and still has to compensate the missing part in the following year. 
Listed in the table below are all the targets and the tariff contributions in the period 2005-
2010. 
Figure 5 – Targets and tariff contribution of TEE system  
Source: AEEG 2012 
As it is possible to observe in the reference period 2008, the government decided to increase 
considerably the target (tripling the amount). This has led the system of white certificates to 
have difficulty to achieve the objective that year and also those of the following years. For 
instance, in 2010 only 62,3% of the national target was achieved, due to the fact that 38 
distributors had exceeded the quota of 60%, 5 had not exceeded it, and 3 had not sent 
communication about their results (AEEG, 2012).  
In Italy other mechanisms for development of energy efficiency are present besides the white 
certificates system, such us: minimum standards of energy performance of buildings, 
incentives for eco-friendly cars and trucks up to 3.5 tons, deduction from the income taxes for 
intervention on electric motors and deduction from the income taxes for intervention on 
existing buildings (MISE, 2011). The latter was introduced in February 2007 and permits 
deduction from the income taxes up to 55% of the cost sustained  to implement certain types 
of energy efficiency renovations or sources of renewable energy in existing homes. These 
include the replacement of the heating system, attic and wall insulation, windows and doors 
replacement, the entire building exterior, and solar panels to be used for heating water. To 
obtain the tax credits it is necessary to provide a professional engineer's certification of the 
renovations and the estimated energy savings (Alberini et al., 2013). 
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If the situation is analyzed as a whole and not only through the white certificates system, the 
policies introduced in Italy have provided better results than expected. This is clearly shown 
by observing the data contained in the Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2011. The annual 
energy saving achieved by 2010 was 47,711 GWh (while the expected was 35,658), and about 
70% of that saving, amounting to 31,427 GWh, came from the residential sector (PAEE, 
2011).  
3.5 France 
In July 2005 energetic savings certificates were introduced after the liberalization of energetic 
market. It is possible divide the time of introduction of energy savings system into 4 parts, the 
first: July 2006 -  July 2009, second: July 2009 - December 2010 (no obligations on 
providers), the third: January 2011 - December 2013 and the last: 2013 - 2016. Savings 
obligations concerned providers of electricity, gas, air conditioning (cold and warm) and oil 
for household heating, in the first period.  Afterwards, in the third period they were extended 
to providers of traction fuel, leading so the obligated parties at a number of 2080 companies. 
Moreover, admitted to the system were: local and regional authorities, public housings and 
the ANAH (national agency of housing) (Varese, 2013). 
The target defined for the first period was to achieve savings for 54 TWh cumac, a target that 
was exceeded by 20%. For the third period was decided to realize 345 TWh cumac of savings 
and 90 TWh of those had to come from traction fuel providers. The costs for achieving the 
target of the first period (2006-2009), were 700.000€/year for administrative costs and  210 
million € (or 0,39 cent.€/kWh) for the implementation of the measures. 
Cumac is an abbreviation of "accumulation and actualization" and it is the unit of measure 
used in French system of white certificates. Accumulation indicates that is considered total 
saving obtained during all life of the implemented measure. Actualization indicates that is 
applied discount rate (4%) for actualize the value of saving. 
Certificates (Certificats d'économies de l'énergie, CEE) are implemented by Directorate-
General of Energy and Climate (DGEC), part of Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable 
Development and Energy. National Office of CEEs (PNCEE) examines and evaluates the 
proposals for CEE. The procedure for obtaining the certificates is not complicated. It involves 
an agent sending a request at PNCEE and after a period from 1 to 6 months, in relation with 
the complexity of measures, the applicant receives the answer. The minimum size must be at 
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least 20 GWh cumac and this is a high quantity for small implementations, but system gives 
the possibility to aggregate the requests, for achieving the minimum threshold. The costs of 
investment afterwards can be transferred by obligated parties on their customers through the 
increment of electricity tariffs.   
This system involves the payment of a fine (0,02 €/KWh cumac) for every KWh that is 
missing to achieve the targets. Obligated parties can reach their targets in three ways: 
 introducing an incentive for encouraging their customers to invest in energy efficiency 
measures; 
 purchasing CEEs in the market; 
 investing directly in projects to obtain certificates. 
If it is chosen to invest directly in projects, in turn, there are three possibility: 
 Standardized operations: measures agreed in advance and formally adopted. French 
departments are categorized in 3 different climate zones for helping the agents to 
decide the suitability of the interventions in each situation. The saving in this case is 
calculated by summing the contribution of each standard measure defined through 
technical data sheets (known as “fiches”); 
 Specific operations: measures that have not been standardized, due to be less frequent 
or because it is difficult to standardize the number of CEEs. To help agents in the 
implementation of the measures and in the evaluation of the savings, there is a manual 
realized by ADEME (Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie), 
DGEC and ATEE (Association Technique Energie Environnement); 
 Additionally,  have been approved programs in addition to CEEs system, through 
which improve the energy efficiency of families suffering energy precariousness and 
poor access to housing. The participation in this program permits to receive a certain 
number of CEEs. 
For standardized operations are present a total of 270 standard measures, principally in the 
building sector (residential and commercial - insulation, lighting, heating system), but even in 
industrial sector, transport, agriculture and in the grids (electric and gas).  
Instead, if it is chosen the market solution, obligated parties can purchase the certificates in 
the EMMY, the national register of energy saving certificates, which puts in contact buyers 
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with sellers and publishes the average monthly price like a reference to decide the right 
selling price of certificates.  
In the end, the companies or the agents non-admitted, can associate with the obligated parties 
to carry out their projects. The terms of the cooperation are decided together, as well as the 
financing and help that will receive the non-admitted agents from the obligated parties. 
During the workshop on Suppliers Obligations and White Certificates in Varese 2013 were 
illustrated praises and criticisms on French system, obtained from years of experience on this 
scheme (Varese, 2013). These assessments are listed in full in the lines below.  
 The CEEs scheme has been well accepted, notably because energy efficiency 
measures targeting their clients may be beneficial to the energy suppliers. 
 The scheme works: all major suppliers have fulfilled their energy saving obligations 
during the first period and have adapted their commercial policy to include energy 
efficiency issues. 
 The definition of standardized actions is an efficient way to encourage actions and 
limit administrative costs. 
 The freedom left to energy suppliers (for example, an electricity supplier can realize 
saving actions in the transport sector) and the ability to trade certificates enhance the 
cost efficiency of the scheme. 
 Legal entities who are not under obligations don't massively participate. 
 A need for simplification of CEE applications is expressed by most stakeholders. 
3.6 Great Britain 
In January 2013 Green Deal was introduced in Great Britain, in replacement to the two 
programs present at that moment : CERT (Carbon Emissions Reduction Targets) that was 
active from 2008 to 2012 and CESP (Community Energy savings Program) that was active 
from 2009 to 31 December 2012. The main characteristic of this scheme is to finance energy 
efficiency measures on households and firms, with the particular mechanism that investment 
costs are recovered with the money saving in the bill. Moreover, in cases of low income 
households or interventions with high technical difficulty, was introduced another program in 
addition at Green Deal, called ECO (Energy Company Obligation), which covers financially 
the measures implemented in these particular situations. 
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Green Deal 
Green Deal is managed by Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) and will be in 
force up to 2020. It's principally a financial instrument, studied to overcome the high initial 
investment costs that are one of the principal barriers for the diffusion of energy efficiency 
measures. The electricity operators provide the money to households and firms for the initial 
investment; money that afterwards is recovered through the house's electric bills. It is very 
important to focus on this point because the debt is not on the customer but on the houses 
where he lives, hence if he changes domicile, the debt will not be paid by him but by the new 
tenant. 
The procedure to obtain the access at Green Deal program may be divided in four different 
steps: 
 the client has to contact an independent advisor (who might not be free) for define the 
possible measures that can be implemented and to estimate the amount of energy that 
will be saved; 
 after the first step the client has to contact an accredited firm (Green Deal provider),  
which discusses the implementation and the financing of the measures proposed by the 
advisor; 
 if the client and the accredited firm arrive to an agreement, the firm will contact the 
installation company for implementing the planned measures;  
 finally, the client will find the installments to repay the investment on his electricity 
bill. 
Observing the last step of the procedure described above, it is clear that the economic capacity 
of the client to repay the investment is very important. For this reason to ensure that the total 
amount of the monthly bill remains the same, is present a rule, called "Golden Rule": the 
energetic saving must be economically greater or equal to the part of the bill intended to repay 
the investment. 
Moreover, it is important to specify that also if the investment is repaid by clients through a 
quota in their electricity bills, the accredited firms that are financing the interventions are 
repaid. These take the money from a Special Purpose Vehicle formed by banks, pension 
funds, particular investors, and Green Deal Finance Company (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). 
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To decide the type of measures to be implemented, the independent advisors can use a list of 
measures which have been approved for the Green Deal. A corresponding list of products, 
materials and specification standards is contained in a publicly available Code of Practice and 
updated regularly to enable a dynamic market in technological improvement (DECC, 2010). 
The measures ranging from installation of equipment for heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning more efficient, up to the micro generation, also passing for isolation of floor, 
roof and walls, double glazing, isolation of doors and efficient lighting (Sàenz de Miera et al., 
2013). The calculation of total savings of each operation is performed by adding the 
contribution in terms of savings (defined in Code of Practice) provided by each implemented 
measure. 
According to the DECC, the program is expected to help to implement energy efficiency 
measures in 230,000 homes each year until 2020 and reduce the emission of houses and firms 
for a total of 4,5 millions tons of CO2 every year (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). 
At October 2013 were accredited 2687 independent advisors and 112 accredited firms, also 
101.851 GD Assessments were lodged (DECC, 2013). 
ECO (Energy Company Obligation) 
The program of obligations on the energetic companies, activated 1 January 2013 up to 31 
March 2015, sets energy savings targets measured in terms of emission reduction that the 
companies have to achieve. The program is administered by Ofgem (Regulator of gas and 
electricity market), which also verifies the achievement of the targets, that have to be satisfied 
through the implementation of energy efficiency measures on the low income households. 
The companies cover partially or completely the costs of the measures that otherwise would 
not be implemented. Hence for this, it's possible to affirm that ECO is a subsidies packet in 
addition to Green Deal, for ensuring to all the access to energy efficiency measures, also to 
low income households. 
To meet their obligations the companies can realize bilateral agreements with the accredited 
firms at Green Deal or through the creation of their personal accredited firm.  Moreover, it 
must be specified that there are three types of binding obligations for the energetic companies: 
 “Affordable Warmth” Obligation: also known as Home Heating Cost Reduction 
Obligation, requires that energy providers carry out interventions in order to improve  
the efficiency of houses with low energy performance; 
32 
 
 "Carbon Saving Communities" Obligation (CSCO): at least 15% of total interventions 
must be implemented in economically depressed zones of England, Scotland and 
Wales; 
 "Carbon Saving Obligation" (CSO): for those cases with high complexity of 
intervention wherein there is provided a certain grade of wall isolation and others 
measures to reduce heat losses. 
The electricity companies, which initially execute the investment, will be able to recover it 
through energy tariffs of all consumers. 
The objectives for ECO are divided in relation with the different types of obligations. For the 
Affordable Warmth Obligation in 2013/14 the number of households identified to suppliers 
will be around 1 million, rising to around 1.3 million by 2014/15. Instead under the CSO are 
expected 20.9Mt lifetime CO2 savings by March 2015 and  around £760 million annually of 
investment to achieve this target and with the CSCO are expected 6,9Mt lifetime CO2 savings 
by March 2015, at an estimated cost around £190 million per year (DECC, 2012). 
Provisional figures, which are subject to further checks by Ofgem, show there were 303.795 
measures installed under ECO up to the end of September and £288 million worth of 
contracts had been let through ECO brokerage up to end of October. The majority of all 
measures installed under ECO were for loft insulation (32 per cent of all ECO measures), 
boiler upgrades (27 per cent) and all solid wall insulation types (4 per cent) (DECC, 2013). 
Interaction Green Deal - ECO  
The interaction among Green Deal and ECO is linked to the respect or less of the Golden 
Rule. If it is respected, the customer will be able to face alone the costs of measures because 
he will find substantially each month an unchanged electricity bill than before. Instead, if the 
costs of measures are higher than the future economic savings, it is possible the intervention 
of ECO, which covers the additional costs. Of course this happens only if the subject has got 
the requirements necessary to access at the program. In this way, the investment is supported 
in part by the costumer and in part by the electricity company. 
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In the following diagram is summarized in detail the financing system of ECO and Green 
Deal : 
 
Figure 6 - Financial flows of a measure, in the case where the Green Deal is combined with 
the ECO obligation 
Source: Decision of CE on the provision of public funds to the Special Purpose Vehicle (CE, 
2013), pg. 25) 
 
3.7  Energy efficiency obligations systems - Summary table 
 Denmark Flanders Italy France Great Britain 
Type Energy Efficiency Obligations Systems 
Name Energiselskabemes 
spareindsats 
Rationeel 
Energieverbruik 
Titoli di 
Efficienza 
Energetica 
Certificats 
d’Économiede 
l’Énergie 
Green Deal ECO 
Start year 2006 2003 2005 2006 2013 2013 
Year-end 2020 2012 2016 2016 2020 2015 
Obligated 
Parties 
electricity, gas, 
commercial oil,  and 
district heating grid 
distributors 
electricity 
distributors 
electricity and 
gas 
distributors 
electricity, gas, 
air conditioning 
and fuel traction 
distributors 
electricity distributors 
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Agencies 
implicated 
Danish Energy 
Agency 
 VEA 
GSE, GME, 
ENEA, AEEG 
DGEC, PNCEE, 
ADEME, ATEE 
DECC,  
advisors,  
accredited 
firms, 
Ofgem 
Actions 
200 standard 
measures and free 
interventions in all 
the sectors, except 
the transport 
Free (principally 
in residential 
sector) 
Consumptive, 
technical data 
sheets, all the 
sectors + 
emission 
reduction and 
technological 
innovation 
270 standard 
measures,  
specific 
operations and  
participation in 
programs for 
low-income 
family 
Standardized 
measures 
Residential 
sector 
Costs 
5,6 c€/kWh, 
including 
administrative and 
implementation 
costs 
65 M€  of  
implementation 
costs  in 2011 
unitary 
contribution 
on tariff -
92,22 €/TEE 
Administration: 
700.000€/year, 
implementation 
costs (2006-
2009): 210M€ 
(0,39 c€/kWh)  
- 
£950 
million 
annually 
Fines - 0,10 €/KWh 
flexible 
system 
0,02 €/KWh 
cumac 
- - 
System for 
recovering 
the costs 
increase of customer 
tariffs 
regional 
subsidies and  
electricity tariffs 
unitary 
contribution 
on tariff 
electricity tariff 
customer 
tariffs 
(Golden Rule) 
tariffs of 
all 
consumers 
Outcomes 
success of system 
and increase of 
targets 
targets exceeded 
widely every 
year 
difficulty to 
achieve the 
targets after 
2008 
target was 
exceeded by 
20% (2006-
2009), 
praises and 
criticisms on 
system (2011-
2013) 
- - 
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4 REFLECTION ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES – General Issues 
In the previous chapter all the information and data necessary to understand the difference 
between the various energy efficiency policies implemented in Europe and their strengths and 
defects are provided. Starting from this assumption, now this work wants to concentrate more 
on the issues that characterize these policies. 
Through an analysis on the methods of work, on results, on energy sectors interested, methods 
of financing and complexity of the European policies, it has been possible identify seven 
different issues, ranging from the absence of actions on the behavior of consumers and Free-
riding Behavior up to the little consideration of transport sector, passing for high initial costs, 
accessory costs, equity problems and wrong analysis of the outcomes. Of course, the absence 
of actions on the behavior of consumers and the presence of Free-riding Behavior would be 
inadvisable due to the loss of effectiveness/efficiencies of the measures implemented, but 
also, high initial costs and accessory costs (that cause  the creation of access barriers to the 
policies), equity problems and errors in the evaluation of the results are not to be 
underestimated.  
In the following sections, these topics are shown and widely commented given their 
importance.  
4.1  Absence of actions on the behavior of consumers 
An important element to consider when analyzing the obligations systems of energy saving is 
that they are concentrated on the behavior of the energy providers, but not on the behavior of 
the consumers (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). For instance, many policies impose to providers 
to carry out energy efficiency measures but they do not require that then the beneficiaries 
have consumptions lower in line with what was assumed before the interventions. This 
statement introduces one of the most important issues related with the aforementioned energy 
efficiency policies known as the Rebound Effect. This effect indicates a situation when an 
improvement in energy efficiency does not bring about a proportional reduction in energy 
demand (Linares and Labandeira, 2010).  
The lack of actions on the consumer behavior is one of the reasons that can lead to an increase 
of the presence of the Rebound Effect, due to the fact that consumers use more of an energy 
service when it becomes cheaper thanks to the efficiency improvement (Constable et al., 
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2012). As long as the demand of energy is lower than that present before the efficiency 
improvement, policies can be considered as an instrument that leads to positive outcomes. 
Instead, the cases in which the demand comes to be higher than before and when the gap 
between the demand before and after the realization of the measures is not very wide, we are 
presented with a predominant Rebound Effect, and this nullifies the effectiveness of the 
policies. Precisely in these cases the outcomes of the energy efficiency policies can be 
considered unsuccessful and this failure can be attributed in part to the absence of 
interventions on the behavior of consumers. 
4.2  Free-riding behavior  
It is necessary to start from the idea that the energy efficiency policies have a cost and, as was 
illustrated in the previous chapter, this cost can involve the consumers that have benefited 
from them (Green Deal GB, Denmark) and also all the national consumers (Italy, Eco GB, 
France, Flanders). For this reason, it is important to maximize the efficiency of the policies, 
reducing hence the wasted resources (Linares and Labandeira, 2010). One phenomenon that is 
most prevalent in this case is the Free-Riding behavior, which occurs when agents receive 
incentives to realize energy efficiency measures that would be implemented also in absence of 
incentives. There are 3 cases that explain why this may happen (Alberini et al., 2013): 
 The characteristics of energy efficiency measures are not separable from other 
technical or aesthetic features that would have motivated the renovation anyway. 
 The agents were already convinced that the resulting efficiency improvement was 
worth its cost. 
 The agents replace existing equipment only when it breaks beyond repair. 
Different studies were done on this issue and from them it was discovered that Free-Riding 
behavior is a fairly widespread phenomenon.  To further argue this statement, an analysis was 
conducted by utilities and it suggested that the share of free-riders ranges between 0 and 50% 
(Joskow and Marron, 1992, cited by Alberini et al., 2013). Entering more into specifics, it was 
estimated that 89% of the households of a group taken as sample would have purchased a 
high-efficiency heating system even in the absence of subsidies (Malm, 1996, cited by 
Alberini et al., 2013). Yet another specific example, an Italian study on the targets obtained 
by tax credit policy on energy efficiency renovations allowed them to observe that tax credit 
37 
 
has had no effect on heating system replacements, or that Free-Riding behavior must have 
been pervasive (Alberini et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that limiting the Free-Riding behavior allows the 
concentration of resources on projects that really need incentives to be made. Moreover, it 
helps to reduce the costs of energy efficiency policies to achieve the national targets, if the 
agents who do not need the incentives are convinced to implement the measures in parallel. 
4.3 High initial costs 
This issue does not affect the case of energy efficiency measures implemented through the 
obligations systems, but measures implemented in a context in which the households are 
incentivized to carry out energy efficiency renovations in their houses. This can be the case of 
Italy, where a deduction from the income taxes up to 55% is present for the renovations of 
residential buildings with energy efficiency criteria. The idea is to have a discount on the 
initial expenditure, thanks to the deduction from the income taxes and subsequently recover 
the money of the investment through the savings in the energy bills. The system is excellent 
so as it is designed, but it presents an obstacle: the high initial costs, related to the energy 
efficiency measures implemented. Indeed,  the initial investment costs could be very high if 
compared with the economic availability of the households with low-medium income, causing 
therefore a reduction of the share of potential beneficiaries. 
A solution to this problem has been found in Great Britain with the Green Deal. Its purpose is 
to overcome the high initial costs through the intervention of the electricity operators, which 
provide the money to households for the initial investment; money that afterwards is 
recovered through the house's electric bills. However, this system is not exempt from 
criticism. The fact that the debt is associated to the house and not to the owner can have a 
negative effect on the real estate market, for the reason that the buyers will be reluctant to buy 
a house with above additional burdens. Moreover, the interest of 7% on the financing 
provided by the Green Deal is high and it may lead to the situation in which many participants 
fail to meet the Golden Rule (the energetic saving must be economically greater or equal to 
the part of the bill intended to repay the investment) and they are therefore excluded from the 
program. 
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In conclusion, although there are these critical points, the system adopted in Great Britain can 
be considered a valid solution and a base from which begin for developing a system that 
allows to overcome the barrier introduced by the high initial costs. 
4.4 Accessory costs 
When analyzing the costs of energy efficiency policies, it is possible to commit the error of 
not considering, whether only the costs linked to the implementation of measures are taken 
into account. Indeed, all the contour costs needed to finance the activities that allow the 
proper functioning of the system would be neglected if this error was committed.  These 
costs, which may be defined as "accessory costs", are additional costs whose elimination is 
not practical. Of course, they can be reduced, but this would require a modification of the 
structure of the systems. 
In these costs are included administrative costs, which are common to all the schemes, and 
access costs also known in literature as transaction costs, which are present in Italy and Great 
Britain. These two cases are developed further in the following sections. 
Administrative costs 
Administrative costs are present in all the European policies of energy efficiency listed in the 
previous chapter and are related to the level of complexity of the scheme of each country. Of 
course, a greater complexity involves the need to have more government agencies (more 
offices and staff) for the management of system and consequently greater administrative 
costs. For example, recall the Italian case where an agency for the management of the system, 
one for the evaluation of requests of certificates, one for their issue and a market where it is 
possible to exchange them are all present. All of this has a cost and it is important to not 
forget that this cost is paid by consumers in their energy bills; therefore their obligation is not 
negligible. However, the quantification turns out to be difficult due to the lack of information. 
Normally, only the total costs of the policies are provided and not the costs for each type of 
expenditure (except France, 700.000 €/year for administrative costs (MEDDE (2006), cited by 
Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013)) and this hinders the possibility to define the proportion between 
the money spent for the measures and the money spent for the operation of the system, which 
could be a good indicator to understand whether the system is economically efficient or not. 
 
39 
 
Access costs 
This is a problem that characterized the Green Deal and the Italian tax credit system. In Great 
Britain, the “access cost” is none other than the cost of the advisory service provided by the 
independent adviser. Its amount is not very high but it is enough to discourage a lot of 
consumers (especially the small ones), due to the fact that it is asked of them to pay for a 
service that could be considered as an informative step, given that only in the following one 
will be decided the measures that will be made and their price. Instead, in the Italian system 
of tax credit, this cost is related to the engineer's certification of the renovations which 
accompany the application for the tax credit. Unlike the Great Britain, in Italy the clients have 
to pay this cost only at the end of the decision-making process when they are convinced to 
make the renovations, hence the daunting effect of the additional cost is minimal. 
Unfortunately, another problem might discourage the Italian customer: the burdens due to the 
relationships with the public administration. For instance, Alberini et al. (2013) suspect that 
for most the households examined in their study, these burdens were sufficiently heavy to 
discourage the submission of the application, even if the households were aware of the tax 
credit policy. 
4.5 Equity problem 
The policies that finance energy efficiency measures through an increment on the tariffs of all 
the consumers (i.e. Italy, Eco GB, France, Flanders) could be defined as unequal. To 
understand the meaning of this statement one must consider the potential of saving of the 
medium-high income and low-income classes. The wealthy classes, thanks to their spending 
capacity, have high consumptions and hence a wide potential of saving, while the 
disadvantaged classes are characterized by a small potential for saving, linked to the low 
consumptions attributable to only the most essential energy needs. Therefore, the major 
beneficiaries of the energy efficiency measures end up being those who have the greatest 
chance of saving (medium-high income classes), creating what might be considered a transfer 
of income from low income households to medium-high income households. 
In conclusion the low-income classes finance energy efficiency measures which are 
implemented in the houses of medium-high income classes, serving to increase the economic 
welfare of the latter thanks to a reduction of the amount of energy bills. 
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4.6  Wrong analysis of the outcomes 
All the countries in EU which have introduced energy efficiency policies have experienced 
outcomes that, in terms of energy saving, have been positive and in some cases above the 
targets. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that these policies have been a success, comparable 
with the success obtained by the energy efficiency California policies introduced in the mid-
1970s, from which many others American states have taken example for designing their 
energy policies. On the Californian case, given the high number of years and data that can be 
analyzed, many studies have been made to better understand this success. Between these 
studies it is interesting to quote Levinson (2013), who casts doubt on the effectiveness of the 
measures undertaken and in fact argues that the energy saving occurred thanks to other 
factors. For instance, for the consumptions in the residential sector, factors like migration of 
population, the climate and changes in the society characteristics (household incomes, 
household sizes, home sizes) have led him to conclude that the savings can be explained by 
long run trends unrelated to energy efficiency. In the transport sector he affirms that the 
savings are 100% illusory and that they can be explained by a relative decline in miles by 
Californians. Only the industrial and commercial sectors, in his opinion, have benefited from 
the energy efficiency measures.  
Citing this study, however, there is no intention to assert that the savings in EU are related to 
other factors and not the effectiveness of the policies, but rather to invite a critical approach to 
the results so that during the phase of determination, all the factors which might influence the 
results have been taken in consideration.  
4.7  Saving in the transport sector: an untapped possibility 
In many European economies, the transport sector represent a very important part (about 1/3) 
of the final energy consumptions (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). Therefore, it can be 
considered a strategic sector (like the electricity and natural gas sectors), in which invest in 
order to reach the national targets. In support to this, it is possible to cite the study performed 
by Energy Economics Group (2009) for the European Commission, in which the total saving 
potentials in EU-27 level within the transport sector are quantified in 95 Mtoe in 2020 and 
132 Mtoe in 2030, assuming an High Policy Intensity Scenario (which implies removing 
barriers to energy efficiency, a high policy effort to overcome the barriers and low discount 
rates for investments in energy efficiency). Despite this, the majority part of the policies that 
41 
 
have been implemented until now in Europe, have not focused on this area. Several allow to 
implement measures in the transportation sector, but only in France this sector is considered 
strategic on par with those of electricity and gas. Just for its importance an obligation scheme 
on traction fuel providers was introduced in 2009, with the goal to achieve a saving of 90 
TWh within 2013. Together with this, also two standardized savings for operations on  tyres 
and two on training were introduced in order to facilitate the providers to fulfill their 
obligations. Unfortunately, all this actions have not led to significant saving interventions in 
this sector due to the possibility for obligated parties  to implement measures in other areas 
outside of their (Sàenz de Miera et al., 2013). 
At this point one might think that the transport sector is a sector with great potential for 
savings but difficult to exploit. Or one might think that there are not difficulties, but that the 
wide dissemination and experience in the use of measures, that can be  implemented in the 
residential and industrial sectors, have convinced many obligated distributors to invest in 
these last rather than in the transport sector. In fact only hypotheses can be made because firm 
conclusions may not be drawn due to the lack of data and experience. 
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5 ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES IN A LIBERALIZED MARKET 
While in the previous chapter the problems related to the energy efficiency policies in a 
monopoly/partially liberalized market have been analyzed, now this work turns its focus on 
what will happen when the market will be totally liberalized. 
More attention has been given to energy efficiency obligations systems, but analysis 
illustrated in this chapter can be considered general enough as to cover other energy 
efficiency policies. 
In the following sections problems that might arise due to the simultaneous effects of energy 
efficiency policies and a liberalized retail market have been hypothesized and analyzed. These 
can be linked to the price of electricity, the business model of retail companies, economics of 
scale,  technical competencies, value-added services, access to the credit market, and the 
possibility of quick change the retail provider. However, it is correct to point out that there are 
no studies to support the considerations made, due to the limited number of years that have 
passed since the liberalization of the retail market (where this happened) or for its incomplete 
opening. 
Before passing to the main part of this chapter, a background on electricity market 
liberalization is necessary in order to understand in which contexts the energy efficiency 
policies have worked and will work. 
5.1 Background on electricity market liberalization 
“Initially the electricity sectors almost everywhere on the earth were characterized by 
vertically integrated geographic monopolies that were either state-owned or privately-owned 
and subject to price and entry regulation as natural monopolies. Generation, transmission, 
distribution, and retail supply of electricity were integrated within individual electric utilities, 
which in turn had exclusive franchises to supply electricity to residential, commercial and 
retail consumers within a defined geographic area. This was the pattern of development for 
many years until several factors such as high operation costs, construction cost overruns on 
new facilities, high retail prices, and the development of more efficient generating 
technologies, led to the need to search for a new reference scheme. The primary goal of this 
new reference scheme was to create new institutional arrangements for the electricity sector 
with the purpose of providing long-term benefits to society and to ensure that an appropriate 
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share of these benefits were conveyed to consumers through prices that reflected the efficient 
economic cost of supplying electricity and service quality. All of this was discovered in a 
scheme characterized by the introduction of competitive wholesale markets in the generation 
sector, the creation of legal monopolies with the presence of basic performance in the 
transmission-distribution sectors and the introduction of competition between suppliers in the 
retail supply sector. The presence of a competitive wholesale market in the generation sector 
has the purpose to provide better incentives for controlling construction and operating costs of 
new and existing generating capacity, to encourage innovation in power supply technologies 
and to shift the risks of technology choice, construction cost, and operating mistakes to 
suppliers and away from consumers. For the transmission and distribution sectors the choice 
to adopt a model based on the legal monopolies with the presence of basic performance for 
the network firms (through the imposition of hard budget constraints) was done to allow a 
well-functioning of the wholesale and retail markets and for stimulating the network firms to 
reduce costs and improve service quality. Finally, retail competition has the purpose of 
allowing consumers to choose the retail energy suppliers offering the price/service quality 
combination that best meets their needs and provides an enhanced array of retail service 
products, risk management, demand management and new opportunities for service quality 
differentiation to better match individual consumer preferences” (Joskow, 2008). 
5.2 The price of electricity and the effects on energy savings   
As already illustrated in the previous section several factors such as high operation costs, 
construction cost overruns on new facilities, high retail prices, and the development of more 
efficient generating technologies, have introduced the necessity to move from  a market where 
the electricity companies were operating in a regime of monopoly/oligopoly to a liberalized 
market. This change, thanks to the possibility of access at the market for new operators,  
introduced a certain degree of competition which led many companies operating in the field 
of generation to improve the efficiency of plants in order to reduce the marginal costs of 
production and those operating in the retail supply to reduce the operational costs; going 
therefore on the whole to limit as much as possible all the economic inefficiencies 
characteristics of a monopoly.  
This containment of costs gave as a result the reduction of the price of electrical energy for 
the end users, a fact that can be considered positive in itself but not as much for saving energy 
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 and for the diffusion of the energy efficiency measures in complex
1
. However, as it has just 
been said, the reduction in the price of electricity can be considered positive in itself and 
hence the effect on energy conservation and diffusion of energy efficiency measures cannot 
be considered as real problems in a general view. But, if we focus, instead, only on energy 
efficiency/energy saving and if external costs are not considered, effects due to the reduction 
of the price cannot be neglected. Indeed, a reduction of the price of electricity can lead on the 
one hand to an increase in consumption and on the other hand to a reduction of efficient 
energy activities in terms of economic convenience and number. Specifically, the need to 
reduce consumptions is not instilled in consumers if the price of electricity is too low and 
therefore also the willingness to adopt measures that permit it. Moreover, in the case in which 
anyway the consumer wants to carry out interventions of energy efficiency, the economic 
saving obtainable through the energy saving would not be very high due to the low cost of 
electricity. This would therefore not allow to amortize the investment in an acceptable number 
of years, thus reducing its economic convenience.  
In conclusion, from what has just been said, the reduction of price of electrical energy can be 
considered positive in itself, but it can lead to an increase of consumption and a reduction of 
measures that can be still considered recommendable measures. 
5.3 Business model of retail companies VS  Energy efficiency activities  
In liberalized markets only transmission and distribution can be seen as a natural monopoly. 
These two sectors are still regulated and they are not opened to competition like the sectors of 
generation and retail supply (as mentioned in section 5.1). Our interest is therefore 
concentrated on these last two sectors and in particular on the retail supply sector. Its opening 
to competition has an unquestionable impact on the business model of retail energy 
companies and on the energy efficiency activities. On the one hand there is an incentive to 
widen electricity sales (if it is connected with a positive margin) and this is obviously in 
contrast with the activities of energy efficiency, which lead to a reduction of sales. But on the 
other hand it provides the possibility to acquire new customers beyond the usual sales area, 
giving the possibility to raise their clients through the supply of value-added services. 
                                                 
1
 Here a elaboration  is necessary: energy efficiency cannot always considered positive. Indeed, the 
recommended measures to implement are those in which benefits are at least equal or exceed the costs. It is 
important to say that some measures can be considered recommended measures, even if they are not worth the 
investment. Because their non-convenience is due to the presence of markets barriers or other externalities. 
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5.4 Economies of scale and increase in the complexity and costs of the  
       public system of management 
The idea at the base of the liberalization of the electricity retail market is to have a greater 
number of companies operating in order to create a competitive environment and to benefit 
from all the advantages that derive from it. However, an increase in companies also involves a 
redistribution of the consumers, with firms that will increase their number and others that will 
reduce it. Anyway, this is not the problem, rather it is the exploitation of the economies of 
scale will be more difficult. Before the liberalization, the various energy efficiency 
obligations systems were imposed to electric companies that operated under a monopoly and 
that had therefore the totality of the clients within a defined geographic area. Now, instead, 
those same clients are redistributed between different companies operating in a liberalized 
market on which the obligations are imposed. It is obvious that it is more difficult to exploit 
the economic savings given by large numbers
2
 because a specific type of intervention of 
energy saving cannot be replicated on a large number of clients as they were previously under 
a monopoly. To better understand this statement, it is sufficient to think about interventions in 
the residential sector (the replacement of windows, of boilers, the insulation of the walls and 
roof), where purchases of large quantities of materials allows for advantageous commercial 
agreements with firms that produce efficient windows, efficient boilers or materials for 
insulation in order to obtain better prices. 
Of course, a solution to this problem can be easily found, for example through commercial 
purchase agreements
3
 among retail providers in order to buy high volumes from the various 
producers of windows, boilers and insulation materials. Looking ahead, these commercial 
agreements could become aggregations among retail providers, therefore undermining the 
idea at the base of the liberalization (more aggregations involve less operators and hence less 
competition). Luckily the reason explained above would affect little on the phenomena of 
aggregations, given that there are elements which have a greater influence, as a reduction of 
management expenditures (with the aggregation it is possible to rationalize the expenditures) 
and the reduction of the price of electricity (with the aggregation the companies have a higher 
numbers of customers and electrical energy to purchase and therefore they may directly 
                                                 
2
 It is important that this large number of customers are concentrated in a particular area, because if they start to 
be away the advantage of economies of scale will be deleted. 
3
 White certificates also have a similar function. 
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contact the producers through OTC (over the counter) contracts, obtaining more favorable 
prices than from the wholesale market).  
Finally, besides a reduction of the advantages offered by economies of scale, liberalization 
also leads to an increase of the complexity and costs of the public system of management. 
Indeed, more retail companies mean more interlocutors with whom to interact to fulfill the 
different procedures that allow the proper functioning of the system (allocation of quotas of 
saving, reimburse the expenditure incurred to perform the work, verification of the 
achievement of the objectives and assignment of fines for whomever does not respect them). 
5.5 Technical competence 
At the time of the electricity retail market’s opening, the various vertically integrated 
companies that operated under a monopoly had set up commercial firms in which they had 
conferred staff that already worked in this sector. Besides these, firms from other sectors or 
newly established ones had also entered in the liberalized market, having seen in this the 
possibility of new business. Precisely because of the entrance of these new firms a problem of 
technical competence might arise in the choice of which better energy efficiency measures to 
implement
4
. Indeed, while the firms that derive from the vertically integrated companies have 
inherited this competence from the old realty, those from other sectors or newly established 
ones are mainly commercial firms with a reduced experience in technical area. 
This problem has a negligible impact in the real market, given that the numbers of these 
purely commercial firms can be considered exiguous if compared with the total number of 
companies. Moreover, in some countries, given the small number of customers that these 
companies have, they are not affected by the energy efficiency obligations systems (for 
example: Italy).  
5.6 Energy efficiency measures as value-added services 
In a retail electricity market widely liberalized and where a high degree of competition is 
present, the providers should develop value-added services in order to differentiate from 
others competitors after an initial phase of price competition. This strategy exists in order to 
remain competitive in the market, maintaining at the same time good profit margins. Indeed, 
the basic idea is that competing on only the electricity price in the long term could become 
                                                 
4
 As it will be explained in next chapter this problem can be solved by white certificates. 
47 
 
economically unsustainable and for this a higher price than the competitors is maintained, 
offering however value-added services in exchange. Between these value-added services 
besides the enhanced metering and control technologies, price and consumption hedge 
contracts, total energy management services, and bundling of a gas, electricity, telephone 
services there are the energy efficiency measures. An example could be that a provider may 
remain competitive despite a higher price of electricity than others if, for instance, he/she 
provides a free consultation on the possible energy efficiency interventions to adopt, also with 
the possibility to realize them, obtaining in this way a twofold advantage: give a value-added 
service and at the same time meet its obligations. 
However this strategy could prove unsuccessful. Indeed, the value-added services have a cost 
for the firm (administrative, staff training, management of new services), which might erode 
the gains obtained thanks to higher prices. This problem is present mainly in residential and 
small commercial sectors, where the sell volumes are small, while in industrial and large 
commercial sectors it is negligible, given that the cost of these value-added services has little 
impact on the gains obtainable from each new client (Joskow, 2000). In confirmation of this 
statement, the survey Retail Energy Marketer Trends 2012 (NEMA, 2012) can be taken into 
account. In fact, this shows that percentage of retailers that offer value-added services in the 
industrial and large commercial sectors is higher than that in residential sector. 
5.7 Difficulty of access to credit market 
The energy efficiency obligations systems, also with some variations from country to country, 
operate by imposing energy saving goals on providers of electricity, natural gas, and other 
energy sources. To achieve these goals providers can perform energy efficiency interventions 
directly for consumers or in some countries they can buy, through a dedicated market, quotas 
of savings from other providers or specialized companies (ESCO). The first solution is the 
most interesting to analyze in a dynamic of a liberalized energy retail market because 
problems of access to credit could enter into play. Indeed, even if the providers are afterwards 
remunerated for the made interventions, they initially have to pay with own resources. While 
before the liberalization, electricity companies were vertically integrated, large in size, and 
with an access to a more facilitated credit market, now they are smaller in size, are less 
structured, and due to the competition they have low gains. All of this could lead banks to 
provide funding with more difficulty, thus putting the capacity of retail providers to achieve 
their goals at risk. Moreover, the possible difficulty of access to credit might discourage the 
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research of innovative energy efficiency measures. Indeed, no retail company would accept 
the risk to invest in innovative solutions when it was already difficult to find funding  for the 
traditional ones. 
5.8 The possibility to quickly change retail providers 
To open the electricity market, which until that moment had been characterized by a 
monopoly, rules from both the supply side and that of demand were changed. Regarding the 
retail market, on the supply side some rules have already been discussed in the previous 
sections, like the possibility of access to new operators and the obligation to set up 
commercial companies for the old operators, while regarding the demand side (end users) no 
rules have been mentioned. This is because potentially only one can have negative effects on 
energy efficiency obligations systems, namely the customer has the possibility to quickly 
change their retail provider. The problems that this introduces are related to the measurement 
of savings, the recovery of investments and how to set the amount of saving that retailers 
must fulfill. In the first case, if the customer changes after the energy efficiency interventions, 
the old provider will no longer have information about that customer’s energy consumptions 
and would therefore not be able to evaluate the effectiveness of the energy efficiency 
measures they implemented. In the second case, instead, the problem of how the provider 
manages the change of supplier can arise in the countries where the recovery of the realized 
energy efficiency measures through an increase of customer's bill is present. Finally, in the 
third case, the problem is due to the fact that the savings target for  each provider is awarded 
annually on a predetermined date, but after the objective has been decided many things can 
change if the market is lively enough. For example, a retail company can gain or lose one or 
more large industrial customers, which may alter substantially the energy sold, and thus make 
the target of savings, whose value had been decided based on the old sales data, wrong. 
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6  HOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY INSTRUMENTS WILL PERFORM 
    IN A LIBERALIZED MARKET 
The previous chapter gave an idea of the possible problems that could arise by applying 
energy efficiency policies in a liberalized market. As it has already been mentioned it is on 
systems of obligations that attention was more focused. However, the analysis can be 
considered general enough as to also cover other policy instruments like: technological 
standards, taxes, subsidies and information policies. 
This chapter, instead, aims to understand how energy efficiency instruments will perform in a 
liberalized market, omitting the traditional problems that characterize each instrument and 
have already been discussed in the literature (e.g. Linares and Labandeira 2010).  
In the following sections the term “recommended measures” is used multiple times. Due to 
this and to ensure a clear understanding of the text, this term can be defined in the following 
way: recommended measures to implement are those in which benefits are at least equal to or 
exceed the costs and also those in which their non-convenience is due to the presence of 
markets barriers or other externalities.  
The following table summarizes the results obtained from the analysis of each energy 
efficiency instrument. 
Energy Efficiency 
Policy Instruments 
HOW THEY WILL PERFORM 
Technological standards 
-  help to limit the increase in energy demand; 
-  help to achieve certain measures, which may be interesting even if the 
price of electricity go down. 
Taxes -  can limit the increase in energy demand 
-  limit the variation in the number of recommended measures 
Subsidies 
- reduce the price of energy efficiency measures for the consumer, thus 
helping to be maintained almost the same number of recommended 
measures, despite the reduction of the price of electricity; 
- utilities' subsidies programs are in contrast with the business model of 
retail companies. 
Information policies 
- energy audits can help to shift the consumptions of customers in periods 
of low demand, with economic advantages for retailers; 
- energy audits can be a useful service to provide customers and these can 
help to compete to make retailers more competitive. 
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Energy Efficiency 
Obligations Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy Efficiency 
Obligations Systems 
Energy efficiency measures as 
value-added services 
Problem related with this is 
common to all systems.  
Business model of retail companies All systems run into this problem. 
Technical competence 
Italy, France, Denmark and Great 
Britain have standard energy 
efficiency measures, which can 
help. Moreover, Italy and France 
have tradable white certificates and 
this eliminates the problem. 
Increase in the complexity and costs 
of the public system of management 
and Economies of scale 
Increase in the complexity and costs 
is present in all the systems, but the 
final level of complexity changes. 
Italian and French white certificates 
solve the problem related to 
Economies of scale. 
Difficulty of access to market 
credits 
This problem is common in all 
obligations systems. For the 
problem of investing in innovative 
measures, Italy found a solution 
with the type IN white certificates. 
The possibility to quickly change  
retailers 
Problems of measuring savings and 
how to set the amount of saving that 
retailers must fulfill are present in 
every system, whereas that of 
recovering investments is present 
only in Denmark. 
Source: Own elaboration 
6.1 Technological standards  
As mentioned in chapter 2, technological standards can be defined as minimum energy 
efficiency requirements for energy equipment (Linares and Labandeira, 2010). Linares and 
Labandeira (2010) affirm that these instruments are very popular due to the lack of 
transparency of the cost for the consumer, to their effectiveness regarding efficiency (although 
not necessarily savings), and to their easy implementation. However, they report that 
standards also have a negative Rebound Effect. 
Neglecting for a moment the negative aspect above mentioned, their impact in a situation of a 
liberalized market can be considered positive. Indeed, considering the context in which we 
focus only on energy efficiency/saving and external costs are not considered, they can help to 
limit the increase in energy demand due to the reduction of the price of energy, even if the 
reduction of operative costs, generated from them, can lead to the presence of a rebound 
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effect
5
, which to some extent offsets this benefit. Moreover, different studies demonstrated 
that standards don't lead to an increase in the price of appliances (even if standards increase 
the costs for consumers, albeit in a hidden way (Linares and Labandeira, 2010)). Therefore, 
they help to achieve certain measures, which may be interesting even if the price of electricity 
go down. 
6.2 Taxes 
The act of taxes on the price signal is considered by many economists to be the most powerful 
instrument for promoting energy conservation and efficiency (Linares and Labandeira 2010). 
Indeed, an increase in the price of energy induce technological changes which in turn allow 
for an increase in energy efficiency (Newell et al., 1999, cited by Linares and Labandeira 
2010). However, recent research (Jossoe and Rapson, 2013) has demonstrated that the 
combination of taxes and information policies has provided greater benefits than the use of 
only taxes and also it is possible to deduce that information policies can be considered an 
instrument more powerful than taxes for the promotion of energy efficiency. 
Before beginning to specify the advantage that taxes could provide, it is necessary to 
contextualize the discourse. Taxes shall not be seen as a solution in response to the reduction 
in the price of energy (and its effects), because the latter is not a problem. However, if we 
focus only on energy efficiency/saving and if external costs are not considered, taxes could 
help to address the problems linked with the reduction in the price of energy. First of all, an 
increase in energy demand would be limited and second, the number of recommended 
measures would not change a lot. Indeed, in a situation in which there are higher taxes on 
energy, the economic savings (generated by energy efficiency measures) would be greater 
than that present in a situation with lower taxes and this would permit the return times of 
investments to be more reasonable. Regarding, instead, the increase in energy demand due to 
the reduction of the price of energy, the mere fact that the prices are higher discourages end 
users to consume, thus reducing this problem. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The rebound effect will probably be higher in a liberalized market, since prices are more difficult to control 
than in a regulated one. This is because in a regulated market the regulator can adjust the price in order to control 
the Rebound Effect. Instead, in a liberalized market, regulators cannot act on the price and hence he doesn't have 
any control on the Rebound Effect. 
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6.3 Subsidies 
These instruments in a liberalized market introduce advantages for energy efficiency 
measures, but also some problems for their promotion. The first affirmation can be easily 
explained considering the promotion of sales of efficient appliances. They can have the form 
of direct payments to tax credits, but anyway they have as a result that to reduce, for the 
consumers, the prices of energy efficiency measures. With the use of a tool such as taxes, the 
reduced variation of the number of recommendable measures (the cost of which does not 
change) is due to an increase in energy prices. Instead, with subsidies, it is precisely the 
reduction of the cost of measures that allows to be maintained almost the same number of 
recommendable measures, despite the fact that energy prices tend to decline due to 
competition
6
. However, even if the problem of the number of recommendable measures is 
solved, the difficulty of their promotion remains. Indeed, one of the major vehicles for the 
promotion of energy efficiency is the utilities' subsidies programs (Linares and Labandeira, 
2010). This task in a liberalized market is then transferred to retail companies, given their 
proximity to end users. However, they have no interest in promoting a policy that leads to a 
reduction in consumptions and hence to a reduction of their earnings. 
Linares and Labandeira (2010) proposed to decouple revenue from sales in order to eliminate 
this problem. But this idea is hardly feasible in this context because it eliminates competition, 
since companies do not have earnings related to their ability to compete on the market, but 
related to parameters defined by a regulator. 
6.4 Information policies 
To give an assessment of how this tool could work in a liberalized market it is necessary to 
analyze it case by case. Labeling, for example, known by consumers as Energy Star or energy 
consumption labels on household appliances, does not introduce any new effect, apart from 
the classic one to help  make the market more transparent. Much more interesting, instead, for 
the advantages that they could introduce, are energy audits (information on the behavior of 
customers). Retail companies could use energy audits to shift the consumptions of their 
customers in periods of low demand. This, in addition to contributing to reduce peak demand, 
can increase the earnings of retail companies. Indeed, energy is normally characterized by 
high prices in peak times and by low prices in off-peak times. Therefore, by bringing the 
                                                 
6
 Even here the contextualization made in the section on  taxes must be taken into consideration. 
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major part of customer demand to off-peak times, retail companies can purchase energy from 
producers at the lowest prices, increasing accordingly their profit margin (supposing that there 
are not two-tier tariffs). Finally, energy audits can also be a useful service to give to 
consumers, and therefore help the retailers that provide them to compete better in a liberalized 
market. 
6.5 Energy efficiency obligations systems 
This type of instrument is affected by a lot of the problems seen in chapter 5. It must be 
specified, however, that not all energy efficiency obligations systems are equal and also that 
not all work in the same way. For these reasons, what wants to be done in this section is to 
illustrate what are the weaknesses and strengths of each European energy efficiency 
obligations systems in the context of a liberalized market. 
For the problem related with energy efficiency measures as value-added services, there is not 
a dedicated section because it is common to all obligations systems and there are no 
comments in addition to the analysis already done in the previous chapter that can be made. 
Business model of retail companies 
As it is easy to understand, all the systems run into with the problem of the business model of 
retail companies and the reasons behind this, have already been discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, in support of the decision to set up obligations systems on retail 
companies, it is possible to affirm that the idea seems reasonable, given their proximity to end 
consumers. The retail companies can be the solution to address the information barriers 
(insufficient information), which lead to wrong decision-making. In particular, the extensive 
relation of retailers with consumers allows getting access to their behavior. Indeed, they have 
information about electricity consumption on each individual client, and sometimes they are 
also more informed than them. 
Technical competence 
Since their entry in force, obligations systems of Italy, France, Denmark and Great Britain 
have had the presence of standard energy efficiency measures. This choice has been made 
besides that for steering retailers on a certain type of interventions, also, from a technical 
point of view, to make the achievement of their obligations more simple. It is not possible to 
deny that mainly new retail companies (commercial) have benefited all of this because they 
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might reduce in this way a part of the technical gap that they had with retail companies 
derived from old vertically integrated companies. However, it not be forgotten that in addition 
to the standard measures, there are also interventions that can be defined as non-standard, 
which require high technical competencies. Moreover, the same standard measures also 
require minimal technical knowledge that are not always present in a purely commercial 
company. 
The problem of technical competence of commercial companies can be quietly neglected in 
the obligations systems present in Italy and France, thanks to the possibility to trade white 
certificates (TEE or CEE). Indeed, in these two systems it is not necessary to have technical 
competences, but it is sufficient to simply have the economic availability for buying white 
certificates from other subjects (ESCO or other retail companies). 
Increase in the complexity and costs of the public system of management and Economies of 
scale 
The liberalization of the market leads to have, in the same way in all obligations systems, an 
increase of complexity and costs of the public system of management. The only thing that can 
change is the final level of complexity. Indeed, it is easily imaginable that countries like 
Denmark and Flanders, which have a more simple organizational structure for managing their 
obligations system, are affected by an increase in the number of operators, but always to a 
lesser extent compared to countries like Italy, France and Great Britain, that conversely have a 
more complex organization. 
Regarding instead the economies of scale, the importance to have the possibility to exploit 
them changes a lot among the systems of Denmark, Flanders and Great Britain and those of 
Italy and France. In these last two, indeed, retail companies that do not have a large number of 
customers, which would allow them to exploit economies of scale, have the possibility to use 
white certificates. Certificates that, for example, may be sold by ESCO or other retail 
companies that run a large number of energy efficiency interventions in order to realize 
advantageous commercial agreements with companies producing efficient windows, efficient 
boilers and insulating materials. 
Difficulty of access to market credits 
This problem is common in all the obligations systems, given that retail companies are 
rewarded for interventions after they are made. This choice, although it may introduce 
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problems of access to the credit market, it is not entirely wrong because constrains of time 
and completion of the interventions are placed, avoiding waste of time and money. Indeed, it 
is in the interest of retailers to finish the work in a short time and control costs, in order to be 
reimbursed by the regulator as early as possible and to not have economic losses on the 
interventions performed. 
However, all this can direct retailers to not carry out innovative interventions, but to continue 
with the more traditional (simpler and less risky), that at times may not be the optimal 
solution in terms of energy efficiencies. The Italian system, in response to this problem or to 
encourage innovation, introduced in 2012 white certificates (TEE) type IN. These reward the 
degree of technological innovation, giving the project a number of certificates greater than 
that theoretically should be released with the classical measures and give the possibility to 
choose a system that ensures a constant value of the certificate for the entire useful life of the 
project (the price of the TEE is no longer tied to changes in the market) (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2012). The Italian way, however, is not the only one that 
can be followed, a special guarantee fund can be set up and could act as a guarantor on loans 
provided by banking systems to retail providers for the realization of energy efficiency 
measures (innovative or not) in order to eliminate funding difficulties. 
The possibility to quickly change  retailers 
The three problems resulting from the possibility to quickly change retailers should be 
analyzed separately because they do not interest all obligations systems in the same way. In 
fact, while the problem of measuring savings and how to set the amount of saving that 
retailers must fulfill are present in every scheme, that of recovering investments is present 
only in countries where the investment money is recovered through the customer tariffs, to 
which the intervention has been implemented. This is the case of Denmark, where 
government grants are not present and therefore retailers can recover their investment through 
an increase of customer's tariff.  
Of course, the problem can be solved. For example the reimbursement of all costs incurred 
might be required, before authorizing the change of supplier. This, however, would bind the 
consumer too much with the retail provider. Or the customer could bring his/her debt, 
meaning that the consumer pays the installments of the debt with the new provider which then 
reimburses the cost of the intervention to the old one when changing providers. 
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For all other countries, instead, there is no problem given that investments are recovered 
through electricity tariffs from all consumers or as in Flanders, where regional subsidies are 
also present. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined how energy efficiency policies are performing now and how they 
will perform under a liberalized market. Attention has been paid mainly on energy efficiency 
policies adopted in Denmark, Flanders, France, Italy and Great Britain, and specifically on the 
instrument of energy efficiency obligations system (even if the analyses is general enough to 
also cover other instruments). This choice was made given their importance and centrality in 
the guidelines present inside European Directive 2012/27, in which, together with this 
instrument, others (energy or CO2 taxes, financing schemes and instruments or fiscal 
incentives, regulations or voluntary agreements, standards and norms for products-services-
buildings-vehicles, energy labeling schemes, training-education) have been indicated to guide 
Member States in the achievement of objectives for 2020. 
With data and information available in literature, it has been illustrated how these obligations 
systems work, the energy sectors they interest, their complexity, their cost, funding methods 
and their results. In Denmark, Flanders and France, this instrument has had considerable 
success and targets imposed on providers were always met and in many cases exceeded. In 
Italy, instead, since 2008 there has been difficulty in achieving these goals for providers, due 
to the decision to triple the required amount of energy to save. Finally, regarding Great 
Britain, a complete evaluation on its system formed by Green Deal + ECO is not present, due 
to the short time passed from its introduction. However, from monthly reports presented by 
DECC, it is possible to note that the British system is having considerable success. 
Despite of the good results in terms of energy savings, some criticisms of this system have 
been advanced. The analysis carried out has led for example, to a criticism of the lack of 
actions on consumers behavior (that is one of the causes that can lead to an increased presence 
of the Rebound Effect), the waste of economic resources due to Free-Riding Behavior, the 
presence of administrative costs which affect in a certain measure on the costs of energy 
efficiency policies, the fact that the potential of the transport sector is not exploited, and 
finally equity problems. Moreover, observations have been done on the Green Deal and 
Italian tax-credit system for their transaction costs and the high initial costs of measures that 
can discourage consumers to realize them. This analysis, anyway, is not an end in itself, but it 
serves to underline weak points more apparent of energy efficiency policies present in 
Europe. 
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Attention has been placed also on possible effects of the liberalization of the electricity 
market on energy efficiency policies, and the problems that could arise have been 
hypothesized and analyzed. It has been noted that these are linked with the reduction of the 
price of electricity (if external costs are not considered), the business model of retail 
companies, the increase of complexity and cost of the systems of public management, 
economies of scale, technical competence, access to the credit market, and the ability to 
quickly change provider. However, it is important to remember that there are no studies to 
support the considerations made, due to the limited number of years that have passed since the 
liberalization of the retail market or for its incomplete opening. 
At this point it was necessary to go deeper and therefore analyze how the different policy 
instruments will most likely work in a liberalized market. 
Energy Efficiency 
Policy Instruments 
HOW THEY WILL PERFORM 
Technological standards 
-  help to limit the increase in energy demand; 
-  help to achieve certain measures, which may be interesting even if the 
price of electricity go down. 
Taxes -  can limit the increase in energy demand; 
-  limit the variation in the number of recommended measures. 
Subsidies 
- reduce the price of energy efficiency measures for the consumer, thus 
helping to be maintained almost the same number of recommended 
measures, despite the reduction of the price of electricity; 
- utilities' subsidies programs are in contrast with the business model of 
retail companies. 
Information policies 
- energy audits can help to shift the consumptions of customers in periods 
of low demand, with economic advantages for retailers; 
- energy audits can be a useful service to provide customers and these can 
help to compete to make retailers more competitive. 
 
 
Energy Efficiency 
Obligations Systems 
 
 
 
Energy efficiency measures as 
value-added services 
Problem related with this is 
common to all systems.  
Business model of retail companies All systems run into this problem. 
Technical competence 
Italy, France, Denmark and Great 
Britain have standard energy 
efficiency measures, which can 
help. Moreover, Italy and France 
have tradable white certificates and 
this eliminates the problem. 
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Energy Efficiency 
Obligations Systems 
Increase in the complexity and costs 
of the public system of management 
and Economies of scale 
Increase in the complexity and costs 
is present in all the systems, but the 
final level of complexity changes; 
Italian and French white certificates 
solve the problem related to 
Economies of scale. 
Difficulty of access to market 
credits 
This problem is common in all 
obligations systems; for the 
problem of investing in innovative 
measures, Italy found a solution 
with the type IN white certificates. 
The possibility to quickly change  
retailers 
Problems of measuring savings and 
how to set the amount of saving that 
retailers must fulfill are present in 
every system, whereas that of 
recovering investments is present 
only in Denmark. 
It is necessary to remember that recommended measures are not only those whose 
implementation provides benefits at least equal to or that exceed the costs, but also those 
whose non-convenience is due to the presence of market barriers or other externalities. 
Moreover, that the reduction of the price of electricity is not a problem in itself but if the 
external costs are not considered, the effects that they introduce cannot be neglected.   
It is possible to affirm, with what has been reported in the table, that in a liberalized market 
(ignoring the classic problems reported in literature), taxes, technical standards, and 
information policies work without any problems, while subsidies need changes related to 
utilities' subsidies programs. A separate discussion must be done instead for obligations 
systems: these have a certain number of problems, some of which can be solved (economies 
of scale, technical competence, innovative solutions, and recovery of the investment), and in 
two cases simply with the introduction of tradable white certificates (economies of scale and 
technical competence). But there are also some, for which, no evident solution has been found 
during this thesis. 
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